@napi-rs/snappy-android-arm-eabi
Fastest Snappy compression library in Node.js
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from broooooklyn to GitHub Actions is the expected napi-rs CI/CD automation pattern; SLSA attestation confirms build integrity. Generalizes to future versions. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): This is a napi-rs platform-specific package; the .node binary is the intended deliverable for Android ARM EABI. Stable pattern for this publisher and package family. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Platform-specific binary packages in the napi-rs ecosystem are intentionally minimal with no deps and sparse READMEs. Not a spam indicator for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 10 of 10)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.3.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.3.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 7.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v7.3.3
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • snappy.android-arm-eabi.node
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.1.1
2 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • snappy.android-arm-eabi.node
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.