@napi-rs/lzma-linux-arm64-gnu
https://docs.rs/lzma-rs binding to Node.js via https://napi.rs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | bundled-binaries | AI (npm-metadata): This package IS the prebuilt native binary — a .node file is its sole purpose as a napi-rs platform-specific sub-package. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from broooooklyn to GitHub Actions is the standard napi-rs CI/CD migration pattern, confirmed by SLSA Sigstore attestation linking the build to the official repo. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): napi-rs platform sub-packages intentionally have minimal READMEs and no runtime deps — this is the expected structure, not a spam indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.4.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.4.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.2.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.4.5
3 findingsPackage contains compiled binaries that could be backdoors: • lzma.linux-arm64-gnu.node
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.1.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.