@napi-rs/cross-toolchain
Create cross-toolchain from https://github.com/rust-cross/manylinux-cross/tree/main
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation — this is a legitimate CI/CD automation transition for the napi-rs org, not an account compromise. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Infrastructure/toolchain package in the @napi-rs org; sparse README and no keywords are expected for this type of package. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 1.0.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.19 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.18 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.17 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.16 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.15 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.14 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.13 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.12 | 3 / 2 | |
| 0.0.11 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.10 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.9 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.8 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.6 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.4 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.0.2 | 0 / 2 |
v1.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-08-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.19
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.18
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.