@napi-rs/cli
Cli tools for napi-rs
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): SLSA provenance attestation confirms publish originated from the official napi-rs/napi-rs CI/CD pipeline, directly countering account-takeover hypothesis for this package. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:joi | AI (typosquat): @napi-rs/cli is a well-established Rust/Node.js toolchain CLI with no relation to 'joi'; the levenshtein match is a string coincidence, not impersonation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Standard rolldown-bundled CJS output with visible rolldown runtime preamble. Not obfuscated — minified CLI bundle. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/cli.js | AI (source-diff): Standard rolldown-bundled ESM CLI entry. Rolldown runtime preamble visible; imports are all known packages. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.js | AI (source-diff): Standard rolldown-bundled ESM library output. Not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/index.cjs | AI (source-diff): Network (Octokit/GitHub API) + child_process (cargo/cross spawning) are core expected features of a Rust native addon build CLI. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/index.d.cts | AI (source-diff): dist/index.d.cts is a bundled TypeScript declaration file generated by tsdown. Long lines are from concatenated type definitions, not obfuscation. Stable false positive for this build toolchain. | ai | |
| provenance | slsa-provenance | AI (provenance): Package consistently publishes via CI/CD with SLSA provenance; this is a stable positive signal for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-takeover | AI (maintainer-change): longyinan is the same person as broooooklyn (LongYinan, GitHub: Brooooooklyn) — the original author consolidating under a different npm account. SLSA provenance confirms CI/CD publish. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): longyinan is the original author (LongYinan/Brooooooklyn); addition is a legitimate account consolidation, not a hostile actor. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): forehalo and broooooklyn removal is part of the same account consolidation by the original author LongYinan. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:env-spread | AI (semgrep): Build tool that spawns cargo/cross subprocesses legitimately forwards process.env to child processes. This is standard practice for build tooling, not secret exfiltration. | ai |
Versions (showing 77 of 77)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.6.2 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.6.1 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.6.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.5.1 | 12 / 14 | |
| 3.5.0 | 12 / 14 | |
| 3.4.1 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.4.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.3.1 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.3.0 | 12 / 15 | |
| 3.2.0 | 13 / 15 | |
| 3.1.5 | 13 / 15 | |
| 3.1.4 | 13 / 15 | |
| 3.1.3 | 13 / 15 | |
| 3.1.2 | 13 / 16 | |
| 3.1.1 | 13 / 16 | |
| 3.0.4 | 13 / 16 | |
| 3.0.3 | 14 / 16 | |
| 3.0.2 | 14 / 16 | |
| 3.0.1 | 14 / 16 | |
| 3.0.0 | 14 / 16 | |
| 2.18.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.18.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.18.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.18.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.18.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.17.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.5 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.16.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.15.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.15.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.15.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.8 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.7 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.6 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.5 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.14.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.13.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.13.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.13.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.13.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.12.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.12.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.11.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.11.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.11.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.11.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.11.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.10.3 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.10.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.10.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.9.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.8.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.7.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.6.2 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.6.1 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.6.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.5.0 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.4.5 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.4.4 | 0 / 16 | |
| 2.4.2 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.4.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.4.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.3.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.3.0 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.2.1 | 0 / 15 | |
| 2.2.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 14 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 14 |
v3.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.2
2 findingsSpreading entire process.env into an object — may capture all secrets Source: https://github.com/napi-rs/napi-rs/blob/d5c3c43b45393f99ba151770f97bd472de533671/src/api/build.ts#L305 303 | process.env.CARGO ?? (this.options.useCross ? 'cross' : 'cargo') 304 | const buildProcess = spawn(command, this.args, { > 305 | env: { ...process.env, ...this.envs }, 306 | stdio: watch ? ['inherit', 'inherit', 'pipe'] : 'inherit', 307 | cwd: this.options.cwd,
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.4
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.3
2 findingsNewly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.1
6 findingsAll previous maintainers (longyinan) were replaced by new maintainers (broooooklyn, forehalo). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.0.0
6 findingsAll previous maintainers (longyinan) were replaced by new maintainers (broooooklyn, forehalo). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.4
2 findingsAll previous maintainers (forehalo, broooooklyn) were replaced by new maintainers (longyinan). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.18.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.17.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.16.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.16.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.16.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v0.2). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.16.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.15.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.15.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.13.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.13.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.13.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.11.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.10.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.9.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.8.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.7.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.6.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.4.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.