@mui/utils
Utility functions for React components.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@types/react-is | AI (dependencies): @types/react-is is a standard DefinitelyTyped type definition package; its inclusion as a dependency in a TypeScript utility library is expected and benign across all versions. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/react-is | AI (phantom-deps): Type-only @types/* packages are conventionally declared as deps without direct imports; consumed by TypeScript at compile time. Stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of mbrookes and mui-release-bot aligns with MUI's transition to GitHub Actions provenance-based publishing. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from human (siriwatknp) to GitHub Actions CI/CD with SLSA provenance — expected for MUI's automated release pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): janpotoms is a known MUI core team member; legitimate maintainer list update. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@types/prop-types | AI (dependencies): @types/prop-types is a standard TypeScript definitions package; unvetted status is expected for type definitions and poses no security risk. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/prop-types | AI (phantom-deps): Type definitions are framework-scoped and loaded by convention; phantom dependency status is expected and benign. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 130)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 9.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 9.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.11 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.10 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.7 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.1.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.1.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.0.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 7.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.4.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.3.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.3.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.2.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.2.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.10 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.9 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.7 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.5 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.4 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.3 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.1.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.0.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.0.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 6.0.0 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.17.1 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.14 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.13 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.12 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.8 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.6 | 6 / 0 | |
| 5.16.5 | 6 / 0 |
v9.0.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-04-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-03-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-03-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.4.9
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-03-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.4.8
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.4.6
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.4.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.4.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.4.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.4.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-01-14. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.3.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-01-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.3.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.2.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.2.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.10
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.8
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.7
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.3
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-10-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-09-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.1
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-29. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v6.0.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-08-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.17.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.16.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.16.13
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-12-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.16.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.16.8
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-11-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.16.6
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v5.16.5
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-07-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.