@mintlify/http-client
The Mintlify http client package
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Mintlify transitioned publishing to GitHub Actions CI/CD automation — a standard org practice. Package is from an established company with 626 versions and no suspicious code changes. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Mintlify publishes via GitHub Actions CI/CD without Sigstore attestation; consistent across all versions of this package. | ai | |
| license | uncommon-license:Elastic-2.0 | AI (license): Mintlify uses Elastic-2.0 across their package ecosystem; this is intentional and not a security concern. | ai |
v0.0.295
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.294
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.293
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.