@microsoft/dev-tunnels-ssh
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:base64-decode | AI (semgrep): Base64 decode is used for PEM key parsing — expected cryptographic operation in an SSH library. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:debug | AI (phantom-deps): debug is a declared runtime dependency; phantom-dep heuristic is a false positive here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.12.36 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.12.29 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.12.22 | 4 / 0 | |
| 3.12.12 | 4 / 0 |
v3.12.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.12.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.12.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.