← Home

@metamask/multichain-api-middleware

JSON-RPC methods and middleware to support the MetaMask Multichain API

10
Versions
MIT
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

kumavismetamaskbotgudahttmrtenmcmirenaugtur

Keywords

EthereumMetaMask

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): Migration from metamaskbot to GitHub Actions CI; consistent with MetaMask org's CI/CD practices. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): Known MetaMask contributors added as maintainers on official @metamask scoped package. ai
publish-pattern dormant-publish AI (publish-pattern): MetaMask core monorepo; release cadence gaps are normal for this package family. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): MetaMask org manages maintainers centrally via metamaskbot; individual removal is routine org hygiene. ai
provenance no-provenance AI (provenance): MetaMask monorepo packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; not a risk signal for this publisher. ai
phantom-deps phantom-dep:@open-rpc/meta-schema AI (phantom-deps): Declared as runtime dep and used in config/schema validation; phantom-dep heuristic false positive for this package. ai

Versions (showing 10 of 10)

Version Deps Published
3.1.4 13 / 12
3.1.3 13 / 12
3.1.2 13 / 12
3.1.1 13 / 12
3.1.0 13 / 12
3.0.0 13 / 12
2.0.0 11 / 12
1.2.7 11 / 12
1.2.6 11 / 12
1.2.5 11 / 12

v3.1.4

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: metamaskbot → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-12) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v3.1.3

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.2

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.1

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.0.0

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.2.7

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.2.6

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.2.5

1 finding
INFO No provenance attestation provenance

[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.