@metamask/core-backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from metamaskbot to GitHub Actions CI; SLSA provenance confirms official MetaMask/core repo. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): MetaMask publishes via metamaskbot without Sigstore attestation; consistent across versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 6.3.3 | 9 / 11 | |
| 6.3.2 | 9 / 11 | |
| 6.3.1 | 9 / 11 | |
| 6.3.0 | 9 / 11 | |
| 6.2.2 | 8 / 11 | |
| 6.2.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 6.2.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 6.1.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 6.1.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 6.0.0 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.1.1 | 8 / 11 | |
| 5.1.0 | 8 / 10 | |
| 5.0.0 | 5 / 12 | |
| 4.1.0 | 5 / 12 |
v6.3.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v6.3.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v4.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.