@metamask/connect-multichain
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): MetaMask org uses GitHub Actions for automated publishing; SLSA attestation confirms CI/CD provenance. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are MetaMask org members; consistent with org-level team management. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/multichain-ui | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/multichain-api-client | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/onboarding | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/mobile-wallet-protocol-dapp-client | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@paulmillr/qr | AI (dependencies): QR code library by known author paulmillr; low-risk utility dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/mobile-wallet-protocol-core | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@metamask/rpc-errors | AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. | ai |
Versions (showing 9 of 9)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 1.0.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.15.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.14.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.13.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.12.1 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.12.0 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.11.1 | 17 / 17 | |
| 0.1.0 | 15 / 16 |
v1.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.12.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.12.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.11.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.