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@metamask/connect-multichain

9
Versions
License
No
Install Scripts
Verified
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

SLSA provenance attestation npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Maintainers

kumavismetamaskbotgudahttmrtenmcmirenaugtur

Keywords

MetaMaskEthereum

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): MetaMask org uses GitHub Actions for automated publishing; SLSA attestation confirms CI/CD provenance. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are MetaMask org members; consistent with org-level team management. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/multichain-ui AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/multichain-api-client AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/onboarding AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/mobile-wallet-protocol-dapp-client AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@paulmillr/qr AI (dependencies): QR code library by known author paulmillr; low-risk utility dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/mobile-wallet-protocol-core AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai
dependencies unvetted-dep:@metamask/rpc-errors AI (dependencies): Official MetaMask package; ecosystem-consistent dependency. ai

Versions (showing 9 of 9)

Version Deps Published
1.1.0 17 / 17
1.0.0 17 / 17
0.15.0 17 / 17
0.14.0 17 / 17
0.13.0 17 / 17
0.12.1 17 / 17
0.12.0 17 / 17
0.11.1 17 / 17
0.1.0 15 / 16

v1.1.0

2 findings
HIGH Publisher changed: metamaskbot → GitHub Actions (on 2026-06-11) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

INFO Has SLSA provenance attestation provenance

Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.

v1.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.15.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.14.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.13.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.12.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.12.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v0.11.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v0.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.