@metamask/chain-agnostic-permission
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from metamaskbot to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA attested, stable for this org. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Known MetaMask org members added as maintainers; legitimate team expansion. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): MetaMask core packages consistently publish without Sigstore provenance; stable pattern for this publisher. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.6.2 | 6 / 10 | |
| 1.6.1 | 6 / 10 | |
| 1.6.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 1.5.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 1.4.0 | 6 / 10 | |
| 1.3.0 | 7 / 10 | |
| 1.2.2 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.2.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.2.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.1.1 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.1.0 | 7 / 9 | |
| 1.0.0 | 7 / 9 |
v1.6.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-06-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v1.6.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.6.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.