@marko/compiler
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/babel.web.js | AI (source-diff): dist/babel.web.js is a bundled browser-targeted build artifact. Long lines are from bundling, not obfuscation. Expected for a compiler package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/babel.web.js | AI (source-diff): False positive — bundled Babel code triggers net+exec heuristic. No actual malicious network or execution patterns in the sample. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase explained by bundling all @babel/* runtime deps into dist/babel.js, which were simultaneously removed from package dependencies. Expected architectural change. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/babel.js | AI (source-diff): dist/babel.js is an esbuild bundle of @babel/* deps (which were removed from runtime deps). Long lines are standard bundler output, not obfuscation. Stable architectural pattern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/babel.js | AI (source-diff): False positive: Babel's code generation uses Function constructors internally; no actual malicious network+exec pattern. This is bundled Babel source code. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from dylanpiercey to GitHub Actions CI/CD — a legitimate and recommended security improvement for the marko-js/marko monorepo, backed by SLSA provenance attestation. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Apparent dormancy is an artifact of the publisher account change (personal → GitHub Actions). Package has 368 versions and active ecosystem use; not a genuine dormancy signal. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@babel/plugin-syntax-typescript | AI (phantom-deps): Framework-scoped Babel plugin loaded by convention in the Marko compiler; not a direct import but a legitimate peer/convention dependency. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:he | AI (phantom-deps): he is a declared runtime dependency; phantom detection reflects config-file-only reference, not a security issue. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:htmljs-parser | AI (dependencies): htmljs-parser is a core Marko ecosystem parser maintained by the same marko-js org; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:self-closing-tags | AI (phantom-deps): self-closing-tags is a declared runtime dependency; phantom detection reflects config-file-only reference, not a security issue. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:complain | AI (phantom-deps): complain is a declared runtime dependency; phantom detection reflects config-file-only reference, not a security issue. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:raptor-util | AI (dependencies): raptor-util is a long-standing eBay/Marko ecosystem utility package; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:raptor-regexp | AI (dependencies): raptor-regexp is a long-standing eBay/Marko ecosystem utility package; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:lasso-package-root | AI (dependencies): lasso-package-root is part of the eBay Lasso/Marko ecosystem; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:self-closing-tags | AI (dependencies): self-closing-tags is a small Marko ecosystem utility; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:relative-import-path | AI (dependencies): relative-import-path is a small Marko ecosystem utility; stable legitimate dependency. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:complain | AI (dependencies): complain is a well-known deprecation warning utility with a long history; no security concerns. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@luxass/strip-json-comments | AI (dependencies): Strip-json-comments utility; no security concerns for this compiler package context. | ai |
Versions (showing 44 of 44)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 5.39.63 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.62 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.61 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.60 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.59 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.58 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.57 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.56 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.55 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.54 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.53 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.52 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.51 | 13 / 1 | |
| 5.39.50 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.49 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.48 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.47 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.46 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.45 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.44 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.43 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.42 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.41 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.40 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.39 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.38 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.37 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.36 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.35 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.34 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.33 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.32 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.31 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.30 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.29 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.28 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.27 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.26 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.25 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.24 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.23 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.22 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.21 | 23 / 1 | |
| 5.39.20 | 23 / 1 |
v5.39.63
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.62
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.61
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-12. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.60
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.59
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.58
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.57
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.56
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.55
6 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.54
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.53
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.52
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.51
4 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.50
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.49
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.48
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.47
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.46
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.45
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v5.39.44
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.43
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.42
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.39.41
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.40
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.39
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.38
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.37
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.36
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.35
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.34
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.32
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.31
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.30
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.29
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.28
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.27
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.26
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.25
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.24
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.23
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v5.39.22
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.39.21
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v5.39.20
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.