@libp2p/interface-pubsub
PubSub interface for libp2p
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed from achingbrain to npm-service-account-libp2p as part of libp2p org's move to a shared CI service account. Repo remains official libp2p GitHub org. Track record: 246 approved / 0 rejected. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Addition of npm-service-account-libp2p and jacobheun reflects legitimate libp2p org maintainer transition, consistent with the official repo and publisher track record. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): uint8arraylist is a well-known libp2p/multiformats ecosystem utility; its addition is consistent with the package's purpose and poses no supply-chain risk. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): The libp2p interfaces monorepo uses 0.0.0 as a standard initial version for interface packages; this is a known ecosystem pattern, not a malicious signal for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Package is ~3 years old, predating widespread provenance adoption. Published by the official libp2p service account with a clean track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 19 of 19)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.7 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.6 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.5 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.4 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.3 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.2 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 3.0.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.1.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.1 | 5 / 1 | |
| 2.0.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 1.0.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 4 / 1 |
v4.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.