@libp2p/interface-peer-info
Peer Info interface for libp2p
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): libp2p monorepo packages are intentionally bootstrapped at 0.0.0; this is a documented pattern for this publisher and ecosystem, not a malware indicator. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@libp2p/interface-peer-id | AI (dependencies): Unvetted dependency is a peer interface within the libp2p ecosystem; stable pattern for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from achingbrain to npm-service-account-libp2p reflects a legitimate org-level transition to a shared libp2p service account; consistent across the libp2p package ecosystem. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): Addition of jacobheun and npm-service-account-libp2p is consistent with the libp2p project's organizational publishing practices; no compromise indicators. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Lack of Sigstore provenance is common across npm; not a disqualifier for established packages with strong publisher track record. | ai |
Versions (showing 12 of 12)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.10 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.9 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.8 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.7 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.6 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.5 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.4 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.3 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.2 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 1.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 2 / 1 |
v1.0.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.8
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.7
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-09-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.