@keyv/bigmap
Bigmap for Keyv
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Publisher jaredwray has a clean track record; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal for this established maintainer. | ai |
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.3.1 | 2 / 6 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 1.2.0 | 2 / 6 | |
| 1.1.0 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.3 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.2 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.1 | 1 / 6 | |
| 1.0.0 | 1 / 6 |
v1.3.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.2.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.