@justins-home/web-domain
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@justins-home/enums | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dep declared but not directly imported; consistent with monorepo/re-export pattern for @justins-home packages. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@justins-home/factories | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org scoped dependency; likely used indirectly or in type definitions within this monorepo-style package ecosystem. Not a malicious signal. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Personal scoped package (@justins-home org) with consistent publishing history; missing metadata is expected for internal/personal packages, not a spam/malware indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Personal scoped package; missing description is consistent across the publisher's package portfolio and not a malware signal. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is common (~88% of npm packages); publisher has a clean track record with no rejected packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 55 of 55)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.1.75 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.74 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.73 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.72 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.71 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.70 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.69 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.68 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.66 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.63 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.62 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.61 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.60 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.59 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.57 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.56 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.55 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.53 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.52 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.49 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.48 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.47 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.46 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.45 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.44 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.43 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.42 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.41 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.40 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.39 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.38 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.34 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.33 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.32 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.31 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.29 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.28 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.26 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.25 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.23 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.21 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.20 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.18 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.17 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.16 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.15 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.13 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.12 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.11 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.10 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.7 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.3 | 4 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 4 / 0 |
v0.1.75
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.74
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.73
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.72
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.71
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.70
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.69
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.68
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.66
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.63
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.62
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.61
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.60
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.59
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.57
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.56
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.53
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.1.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.