@holochain-open-dev/elements
Common utilities and elements to build Holochain web applications
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Holochain ecosystem package; provenance absence is consistent across all 78 versions. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.601.2 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.601.0 | 10 / 6 | |
| 0.600.0 | 10 / 5 | |
| 0.500.1 | 10 / 5 |
v0.601.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zippy314) than the most recent previously approved version (ddd-mtl) on 2026-06-12, but zippy314 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.600.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.500.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.