@holochain-open-dev/core-types
Typescript types for holochain core
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@holochain/client | AI (dependencies): Expected core dependency for a Holochain types package; stable pattern across versions. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Holochain ecosystem package; lack of provenance is common and not a risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.601.2 | 1 / 4 | |
| 0.601.0 | 1 / 5 | |
| 0.600.0 | 1 / 10 | |
| 0.500.0 | 1 / 10 |
v0.601.2
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (zippy314) than the most recent previously approved version (ddd-mtl) on 2026-06-12, but zippy314 is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v0.600.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.500.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.