@hapi/bourne
JSON parse with prototype poisoning protection
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from hueniverse to devinivy reflects the documented hapi.js project transition; devinivy is a well-known hapi.js core maintainer with a long, clean track record. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are recognized hapi.js ecosystem contributors consistent with the project's organizational transition. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 2.1.0 | 0 / 5 | |
| 2.0.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.3.2 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.3.1 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.3.0 | 0 / 3 | |
| 1.2.0 | 0 / 3 |
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.1.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-04-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.