@hapi/bounce
Selective error catching and rewrite rules
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher change from devinivy to marsup reflects the documented hapi.js project governance transition; marsup is a trusted long-standing hapi ecosystem contributor. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): cjihrig and marsup are well-known hapi.js core contributors; their addition reflects the project's organizational transition, not a takeover. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): hueniverse (Eran Hammer) stepping down from hapi.js maintenance is a publicly documented transition; removal is expected and benign. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established hapi.js package predating widespread Sigstore adoption; absence of provenance attestation is not a risk signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.0.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 3 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.3.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.3.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 1.3.0 | 2 / 2 |
v3.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-05-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.