← Home

@hapi/address

npm Repository Homepage

Email address and domain validation

16
Versions
BSD-3-Clause
License
No
Install Scripts
Missing
Provenance

Supply chain provenance

Status for the latest visible version.

No SLSA provenance npm registry signatures gitHead linked

Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.

Maintainers

cjihrigmarsupnlfdevinivywyattlloydbensonnargonath

Keywords

emaildomainaddressvalidation

Accepted risks

Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.

SourceRuleReasonAccepted byWhen
maintainer-change maintainer-takeover AI (maintainer-change): Legitimate hapi.js org governance transition; hueniverse stepped back from hapi ecosystem, replaced by known long-standing hapi contributors. Not a hijack. ai
provenance publisher-changed AI (provenance): marsup is a trusted, long-standing hapi.js contributor (1891 approved packages, 12+ years on npm). Publisher change reflects documented org transition. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-added AI (maintainer-change): New maintainers are all known hapi.js org contributors; legitimate org-level governance change. ai
maintainer-change maintainer-removed AI (maintainer-change): hueniverse (Eran Hammer) is known to have stepped back from hapi.js; removal is part of documented org transition. ai
source-diff large-new-source-files AI (source-diff): New files are TypeScript source and compiled output (dist/esm dirs) consistent with TypeScript migration visible in package.json scripts and devDependencies. ai

Versions (showing 16 of 16)

Version Deps Published
5.1.1 1 / 9
5.1.0 1 / 9
4.1.0 1 / 2
4.0.1 1 / 2
4.0.0 1 / 2
3.2.2 1 / 2
3.2.1 1 / 2
3.2.0 1 / 2
3.1.0 0 / 2
2.1.4 0 / 2
2.1.3 0 / 2
2.1.2 0 / 2
2.1.1 0 / 2
2.1.0 0 / 2
2.0.0 0 / 2
1.0.1 0 / 2

v5.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v5.1.0

3 findings
HIGH Complete maintainer takeover detected maintainer-change

All previous maintainers (hueniverse) were replaced by new maintainers (cjihrig, marsup, nlf, devinivy, wyatt, lloydbenson, nargonath). This is a strong signal of a potential package hijack and requires careful review.

HIGH Publisher changed: hueniverse → marsup (on 2023-02-18) provenance

This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.

LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v4.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v4.0.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v4.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v3.2.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.2.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.2.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v3.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.4

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.3

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

v2.1.2

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.1.1

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.1.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v2.0.0

1 finding
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.

v1.0.1

2 findings
LOW No provenance attestation provenance

Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.

INFO Publisher changed: marsup → nargonath (on 2024-01-01) provenance

[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2024-01-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.