@hanzogui/font-size
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped UI component package in a family of related packages; sparse metadata is consistent across the namespace. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Publisher has a clean track record; missing gitHead reflects a CI change, not a supply-chain indicator. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): No provenance is a weak signal for this established publisher family; no other risk indicators present. | ai |
Versions (showing 15 of 15)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.3.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 7.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 4.4.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 4.3.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.6 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 3.0.0 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.5 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.4 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.3 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.2 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.1 | 1 / 2 | |
| 2.0.0 | 1 / 2 |
v7.3.0
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: zeekay.
v3.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.