@haklex/rich-dynamic-protocol
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 8 of 8)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.26.6 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.26.5 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.26.4 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.26.2 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.26.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.26.0 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.25.1 | 0 / 7 | |
| 0.25.0 | 0 / 7 |
v0.26.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.26.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.25.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.25.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.