@gatsbyjs/potrace
Potrace in Javascript, for NodeJS
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pieh is a known Gatsby core contributor; publisher change from wardpeet to pieh reflects a legitimate internal Gatsby team transition, not a compromise. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): nodebotanist addition is consistent with normal Gatsby org team roster changes; no hostile takeover indicators. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Removal of multiple maintainers is consistent with Gatsby org team restructuring; publisher pieh has strong track record. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | new-deps-added | AI (publish-pattern): jimp-compact is a well-known Gatsby-maintained lighter fork of jimp; this swap is a legitimate dependency optimization, not a supply chain risk. | ai |
v3.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.3.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-08-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.