@formatjs/ts-transformer
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): formatjs monorepo migrated to GitHub Actions publishing; SLSA attestation confirms CI/CD provenance. | ai | |
| semgrep | semgrep:new-function-constructor | AI (semgrep): Used only to validate identifier syntax via `new Function('return {k:1}')` — a well-known safe pattern, not user-controlled exec. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/node | AI (phantom-deps): @types/node is a type-only ambient package; not directly imported at runtime by convention. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@types/json-stable-stringify | AI (phantom-deps): @types/* packages are type-only and never directly imported; phantom-dep false positive. | ai |
Versions (showing 26 of 26)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 4.4.11 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.10 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.9 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.8 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.7 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.6 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.5 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.3 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.2 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 4.4.0 | 5 / 1 | |
| 4.3.3 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.3.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.3.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.3.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.2.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.1.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.7 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.6 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.5 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.4 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.2 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.1 | 6 / 1 | |
| 4.0.0 | 6 / 1 | |
| 3.13.33 | 7 / 1 |
v4.4.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v4.3.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.2.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v4.0.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v4.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.13.33
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.