@formatjs/intl-datetimeformat
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:locale-data/am.js | AI (source-diff): Auto-generated locale data JSON for Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill. Long lines are dense i18n data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Formatjs packages have not historically used Sigstore provenance; absence is a process gap, not a security indicator for this well-established package. | ai | |
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Established formatjs package with clean history; missing gitHead reflects a CI/publish environment change, not a security concern for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:add-golden-tz.js | AI (source-diff): Generated timezone transition data file for Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill; long lines are pipe-delimited zone records, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:locale-data/agq.js | AI (source-diff): Generated locale data file for Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill; long lines are compact JSON locale data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:locale-data/ak.js | AI (source-diff): Generated locale data file for Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill; long lines are compact JSON locale data, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | large-new-source-files | AI (source-diff): New files are generated locale and timezone data for a comprehensive Intl polyfill; large file count is expected when adding full locale coverage. | ai | |
| source-diff | source-size-tripled | AI (source-diff): Size increase is due to addition of comprehensive locale data and timezone data files for the Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill, not injected payloads. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:add-all-tz.js | AI (source-diff): Generated timezone transition data file for Intl.DateTimeFormat polyfill; long lines are pipe-delimited zone records, not obfuscation. Pattern is stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:lib/src/data/all-tz.js | AI (source-diff): Generated timezone abbreviation/offset lookup table; compact data encoding is expected for this i18n polyfill package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/data/all-tz.js | AI (source-diff): Generated timezone abbreviation/offset lookup table; compact data encoding is expected for this i18n polyfill package. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:locale-data/af-NA.js | AI (source-diff): Generated locale data file calling __addLocaleData with structured JSON; @generated comment confirms build artifact, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:locale-data/af.js | AI (source-diff): Generated locale data file calling __addLocaleData with structured JSON; @generated comment confirms build artifact. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@formatjs/intl-localematcher | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org dependency declared in package.json; phantom detection is a false positive for monorepo packages that may use it indirectly. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Monorepo package; README and docs live at repo root. Empty index.js is a re-export shim pattern common in FormatJS packages. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:src/data/all-tz.generated.js | AI (source-diff): File is @generated IANA timezone data (abbreviations + offsets). Long lines are data strings, not obfuscation. Consistent with the package's datetime polyfill purpose. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): FormatJS migrated to GitHub Actions CI publishing; SLSA provenance attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD pipeline. This transition is permanent and expected for all future versions. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Large OSS monorepo; dormancy periods are normal. SLSA attestation rules out account takeover. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 75)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 7.4.7 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.6 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.5 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.4 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.1 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.3.2 | 2 / 2 | |
| 7.3.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 7.2.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 7.2.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.2.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.2.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.2.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.2.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.2.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.1.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.1.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.1.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.6 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.5 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 7.0.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.18.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.18.1 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.18.0 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.17.4 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.17.3 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.17.2 | 4 / 2 | |
| 6.17.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.17.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.16.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.15.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.14.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.13.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.6 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.5 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.4 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.3 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.2 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.1 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.12.0 | 3 / 2 | |
| 6.11.3 | 3 / 2 |
v7.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.3.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.6
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.5
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-09. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.2.3
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-03. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.2
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-01. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v7.2.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v7.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v7.0.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v7.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.18.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.18.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.18.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.17.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.16.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.15.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.14.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.13.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.12.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.12.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.12.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v6.12.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.12.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.12.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.12.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v6.11.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.