@expo/devcert
Generate trusted local SSL/TLS certificates for local SSL development
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| semgrep | semgrep:dynamic-require | AI (semgrep): The dynamic require uses process.platform (a read-only Node.js value) to load platform-specific modules — a standard cross-platform pattern, not a security risk for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established Expo package published long before Sigstore provenance was common; absence is expected and not a risk signal here. | ai |
v1.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.