@everymatrix/cashier-spinner
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): adrian.pripon is an established org publisher with 11k+ approvals; transition from emfe_release appears to be a legitimate internal handoff. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 212)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.67.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.67.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.66.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.66.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.66.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.65.3 | 0 / 0 |
v1.67.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.67.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.66.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.66.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.66.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.65.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.