@ethereumjs/common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@ethereumjs/util | AI (dependencies): @ethereumjs/util is a sibling package from the same ethereumjs monorepo, versioned in lockstep. It is a trusted first-party dependency for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established monorepo package from the canonical EthereumJS org; lack of Sigstore provenance is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.1.2 | 2 / 3 | |
| 10.1.1 | 2 / 3 | |
| 10.1.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 10.0.0 | 2 / 2 |
v10.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.