@ethereumjs/blockchain
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): EthereumJS monorepo packages have not historically published with Sigstore provenance; absence is consistent across all versions and not a security signal for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 10.1.2 | 8 / 2 | |
| 10.1.1 | 8 / 2 | |
| 10.1.0 | 8 / 2 | |
| 10.0.0 | 8 / 1 |
v10.1.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v10.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.1.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v10.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.