@endo/init
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:@endo/harden | AI (phantom-deps): Same-org @endo scope dep; stable false positive for this monorepo package. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.13 | 5 / 3 | |
| 1.1.12 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.1.11 | 4 / 3 | |
| 1.1.10 | 4 / 3 |
v1.1.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.1.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.1.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.