@endo/base64
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): boneskull is a well-established npm publisher (105 approved packages) taking over from kriskowal within the same endojs/endo monorepo org. | ai | |
| publish-pattern | dormant-publish | AI (publish-pattern): Dormancy reflects the monorepo's release cadence, not account takeover; publisher identity and repo URL are consistent. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.1.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 1.0.12 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.0.11 | 0 / 10 | |
| 1.0.10 | 0 / 10 |
v1.1.0
3 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: boneskull.
This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-05-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v1.0.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.