@emotion/hash
A MurmurHash2 implementation
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): The Emotion project transitioned to emotion-release-bot for automated publishing; this is a documented, legitimate organizational change affecting all @emotion/* packages. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): emotion-release-bot and andarist are known Emotion project maintainers; this reflects the project's legitimate maintainer roster, not a compromise. | ai | |
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:hapi | AI (typosquat): @emotion/hash is a legitimate scoped package in the emotion-js ecosystem; the Levenshtein match to 'hapi' is coincidental and not a typosquat. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Emotion packages are published via a release bot without Sigstore provenance; this is consistent across the ecosystem and not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.9.2 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.1 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.9.0 | 0 / 2 | |
| 0.8.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.7.4 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.7.3 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.7.2 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.1 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.7.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.5 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.3 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.6.2 | 0 / 0 |
v0.9.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2023-05-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.9.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2022-07-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.8.0
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2020-03-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.4
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-12-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2019-09-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.7.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.7.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.6.6
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.5
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.4
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.6.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.