@electric-sql/pglite-tools
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-RGYRJTTI.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-compiled WASM glue code for pg_dump; network+exec pattern is standard Emscripten boilerplate. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-J4ZYQ47G.js | AI (source-diff): File is Emscripten-compiled WASM glue code for pg_dump/pg_restore. Network + dynamic execution pattern is standard Emscripten output, not malware. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): kylemathews is associated with Electric SQL; this is a legitimate maintainer addition for this established open-source project. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition from individual publisher to GitHub Actions CI/CD is legitimate for this org. Package has SLSA provenance attestation confirming the pipeline integrity. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-5ITKZ63K.js | AI (source-diff): This is Emscripten-compiled WASM glue code for pg_dump/pg_restore. Network calls fetch the WASM binary; dynamic execution is WASM instantiation. Standard pattern for this package's purpose. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-WAOUATYI.js | AI (source-diff): This is an Emscripten-compiled WASM loader for pg_dump/pg_restore. The network+exec pattern is standard Emscripten runtime bootstrap for loading .wasm binaries, not malware. Stable for this package. | ai | |
| source-diff | net-exec-file:dist/chunk-WKZSYPH3.js | AI (source-diff): Emscripten-compiled WASM loader for pg_dump/pg_restore; network+exec pattern is standard Emscripten bootstrap, not malware. Stable for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 28 of 28)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.6 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.5 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.4 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.3 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.2 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.1 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.21 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.20 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.19 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.18 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.17 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.16 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.15 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.14 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.13 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.12 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.11 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.10 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.9 | 0 / 6 | |
| 0.2.8 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.7 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.6 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.5 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.4 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.3 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.2 | 0 / 5 | |
| 0.2.1 | 0 / 5 |
v0.3.6
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.2
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.3.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.21
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.20
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.19
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.18
2 findingsNewly added file contains both network calls and dynamic code execution. This is a hallmark of dropper/loader malware.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.17
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.16
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.15
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.14
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.13
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.12
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.11
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.10
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.9
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.8
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.7
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.5
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.