@dword-design/defu
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| typosquat | typosquat.levenshtein:debug | AI (typosquat): Package is a scoped wrapper around 'defu', not a typosquat of 'debug'. The name similarity is coincidental; the actual upstream dep is 'defu' as declared in package.json. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Thin wrapper/re-export packages legitimately have minimal READMEs, no keywords, and tiny payloads. Not indicative of spam or malicious intent for this scoped utility. | ai |
v1.0.3
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.