@dolthub/web-utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publishing is expected for DoltHub org packages; not a takeover signal. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Maintainer consolidation under org CI automation; consistent with legitimate org workflow change. | ai |
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.3.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.3.0 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.2.1 | 1 / 22 | |
| 0.2.0 | 1 / 22 |
v0.3.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.