@docusaurus/cssnano-preset
Advanced cssnano preset for maximum optimization.
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:cssnano-preset-advanced | AI (dependencies): cssnano-preset-advanced is a well-known, legitimate PostCSS/cssnano plugin; stable dependency for this Docusaurus CSS optimization preset. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:postcss-sort-media-queries | AI (dependencies): postcss-sort-media-queries is a legitimate CSS processing utility; standard dependency for a cssnano preset. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Provenance attestation is a best-practice recommendation, not a security requirement; established package with strong publisher track record. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher transition from slorber to docusaurus-bot is documented and legitimate within the Docusaurus org. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): False positive: 'fb' refers to Facebook (Docusaurus sponsor), not spam; minimal README is appropriate for a preset package; keywords optional for scoped packages. | ai |
Versions (showing 16 of 16)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.10.1 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.10.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.5.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.4.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.3.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.2.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.1.0 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.9.2-canary-6568 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.9.2-canary-6542 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.9.2-canary-6463 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.9.2-alpha.4 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.9.1-canary-6416 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.8.1-canary-6396 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.8.1-canary-6343 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.8.0-canary-6339 | 4 / 1 | |
| 3.8.0-canary-6338 | 4 / 1 |
v3.10.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.10.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.2-canary-6568
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.9.2-canary-6542
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.2-canary-6463
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.9.2-alpha.4
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.9.1-canary-6416
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.1-canary-6396
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v3.8.1-canary-6343
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-06. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.0-canary-6339
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.8.0-canary-6338
2 findings[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-06-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.