@develit-io/assurance-sdk
Develit Assurance SDK
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Scoped org SDK with legitimate build tooling; sparse metadata is typical for internal/early-stage SDKs, not spam. | ai |
Versions (showing 6 of 6)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 1.0.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.3.0 | 0 / 1 | |
| 0.2.0 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.6 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.4 | 0 / 0 | |
| 0.1.0 | 0 / 0 |
v1.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v0.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.6
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v0.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.