@descope/react-sdk
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/audit-management-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/role-management-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/user-management-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/outbound-applications-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/applications-portal-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@descope/access-key-management-widget | AI (dependencies): First-party @descope org widget; stable false positive for this package. | ai | |
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Large established package; lack of provenance is consistent across all prior versions and is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 110)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.14.15 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.14 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.13 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.12 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.11 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.10 | 10 / 66 | |
| 2.14.9 | 10 / 66 |
v2.14.15
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.14
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.14.13
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.14.12
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.14.11
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.14.10
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.14.9
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.