@cucumber/pretty-formatter
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/composition/composeScenarioSummary.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output with readable logic; long lines from enum/object literals, not obfuscation. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/composition/composeStats.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable business logic, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/formatting/formatPickleStepArgument.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable business logic, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/PrettyPrinter.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable class with documented JSDoc, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/ProgressBarPrinter.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable class, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/SummaryPrinter.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable class with JSDoc, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/theme.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; theme constants with enum keys, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/utils.js | AI (source-diff): TypeScript-compiled output; readable utility functions, not obfuscated. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Publisher changed to GitHub Actions with SLSA provenance attestation; legitimate CI/CD publishing transition. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.3.1 | 2 / 14 | |
| 3.3.0 | 2 / 14 | |
| 3.2.0 | 2 / 23 | |
| 3.1.0 | 2 / 23 | |
| 3.0.0 | 2 / 23 | |
| 2.4.1 | 1 / 21 | |
| 1.0.1 | 4 / 18 |
v3.3.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.0
10 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-22. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.1.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v3.0.0
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-31. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v2.4.1
2 findingsPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
[Accepted risk] This version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-11-02. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
v1.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.