@cosmology/utils
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): pyramation is the documented author; transition from zetazz appears to be a legitimate account consolidation. | ai |
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 2.2.0 | 6 / 2 | |
| 2.1.0 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.0.2 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.0.1 | 2 / 13 | |
| 2.0.0 | 2 / 13 |
v2.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v2.0.2
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.1
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-10-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v2.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.