@commitlint/rules
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): Established commitlint monorepo package with 87 versions and 3000+ days of history; lack of provenance attestation is not a meaningful risk signal here. | ai |
Versions (showing 14 of 14)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 21.0.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 21.0.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 21.0.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 20.5.3 | 4 / 7 | |
| 20.5.0 | 4 / 7 | |
| 20.4.4 | 4 / 7 | |
| 20.4.3 | 4 / 7 | |
| 20.4.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 20.4.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 20.4.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 20.3.1 | 4 / 5 | |
| 20.3.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 20.2.0 | 4 / 5 | |
| 20.0.0 | 4 / 5 |
v21.0.2
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20.4.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.