@commitlint/is-ignored
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
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Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 21.0.2 | 2 / 4 | |
| 21.0.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 21.0.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.5.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.4.4 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.4.3 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.4.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.4.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.3.1 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.2.0 | 2 / 4 | |
| 20.0.0 | 2 / 4 |
v21.0.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20.4.4
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.