@commitlint/ensure
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Keywords
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | no-provenance | AI (provenance): @commitlint/ensure is a long-established package in the conventional-changelog monorepo; lack of Sigstore provenance is a stable characteristic, not a risk indicator. | ai |
Versions (showing 11 of 11)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 21.0.1 | 2 / 1 | |
| 21.0.0 | 2 / 1 | |
| 20.5.3 | 2 / 2 | |
| 20.5.0 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.4.4 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.4.3 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.4.1 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.4.0 | 2 / 2 | |
| 20.3.1 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.2.0 | 6 / 7 | |
| 20.0.0 | 6 / 7 |
v21.0.1
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v21.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.5.3
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v20.5.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v20.0.0
1 finding[Accepted risk] Package was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.