@colijnit/configuratorcore
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 4 of 4)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 262.1.2 | 6 / 0 | |
| 262.1.1 | 8 / 0 | |
| 262.1.0 | 8 / 0 | |
| 261.1.1 | 8 / 0 |
v262.1.2
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (patrickvkeulen) than the most recent previously approved version (jilliscit) on 2026-06-10, but patrickvkeulen is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v262.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v262.1.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v261.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.