@codingame/monaco-vscode-34f8ce27-c826-53e1-8ee1-588f6e115bd7-common
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Versions (showing 5 of 5)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 23.3.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.2 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.1 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.2.0 | 1 / 0 | |
| 23.1.1 | 1 / 0 |
v23.3.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.2.2
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
v23.2.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.
v23.1.1
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.