@cloudflare/worker-bundler
Build and bundle Workers at runtime for Cloudflare Worker Loader binding
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| provenance | missing-githead | AI (provenance): Package has SLSA provenance attestation; missing gitHead reflects CI pipeline change, not a supply chain risk. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-removed | AI (maintainer-change): Cloudflare org restructuring; SLSA attestation confirms legitimate CI/CD publish pipeline. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): cf-npm-publish is Cloudflare's CI publish account; consistent with org-level automation. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): Transition to GitHub Actions CI publisher with SLSA provenance; legitimate Cloudflare org CI/CD migration. | ai | |
| source-diff | obfuscated-file:dist/typescript.js | AI (source-diff): Bundled TypeScript compiler shipped as minified dist artifact; expected for a worker bundler package. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | suspicious-initial-version | AI (npm-metadata): 0.0.0 is a Cloudflare monorepo placeholder pattern; publisher is a trusted long-standing contributor. | ai | |
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Stub/namespace-reservation package in @cloudflare scope from trusted publisher; structural signals are expected. | ai |
Versions (showing 7 of 7)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 0.2.1 | 8 / 4 | |
| 0.2.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.3 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.2 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.1 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.1.0 | 8 / 1 | |
| 0.0.0 | 0 / 0 |
v0.2.1
2 findingsThis version has no gitHead field linking it to a source commit, but previous versions did. This suggests the publish environment changed. Published by: GitHub Actions.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.2.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.1.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-04-11. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Newly added source file contains lines over 3000 chars, suggesting minified or obfuscated code. New obfuscated files are a strong attack indicator.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v0.0.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.