@clerk/backend
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| source-diff | encoded-string-file:dist/fixtures/index.d.ts | AI (source-diff): Test fixture file containing mock PEM/JWK keys for JWT testing — standard for an auth backend library. Not obfuscated payloads. | ai | |
| provenance | publisher-changed | AI (provenance): dominic-clerk is part of the Clerk org team; routine maintainer rotation confirmed by SLSA provenance from CI/CD. | ai | |
| maintainer-change | maintainer-added | AI (maintainer-change): dominic-clerk is a known Clerk org member with 43 approved packages; legitimate team addition. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:@clerk/types | AI (dependencies): @clerk/types is a first-party Clerk package; it is a stable, expected dependency of @clerk/backend across all versions. | ai | |
| dependencies | unvetted-dep:standardwebhooks | AI (dependencies): standardwebhooks is a legitimate open-standard webhook verification library; its use in @clerk/backend is expected and appropriate. Not a security concern. | ai | |
| phantom-deps | phantom-dep:tslib | AI (phantom-deps): tslib is a standard TypeScript runtime helper commonly used as an implicit dependency in compiled TS packages; stable false positive for this package. | ai |
Versions (showing 51 of 64)
| Version | Deps | Published |
|---|---|---|
| 3.7.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.6.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.6.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.5.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.13 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.8 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.7 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.6 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.5 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.4 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.3 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.2 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.1 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.4.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.3.0 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.14 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.12 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.11 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.10 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.9 | 3 / 6 | |
| 3.2.3 | 3 / 6 | |
| 2.33.5 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.33.4 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.33.3 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.33.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.33.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.32.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.32.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.32.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.31.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.31.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.31.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.30.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.30.0 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.7 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.6 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.5 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.4 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.3 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.2 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.1 | 4 / 6 | |
| 2.29.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.28.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.27.1 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.27.0 | 5 / 5 | |
| 2.26.0 | 5 / 5 |
v3.7.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.6.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.5.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.13
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.8
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.7
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.6
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.1
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.4.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.3.0
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.14
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.12
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.11
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.10
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.9
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v3.2.3
2 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-25. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.33.5
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.33.4
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.33.3
1 findingPublished via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.33.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-03-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.33.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-27. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.32.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-26. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.32.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.32.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-20. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.31.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.31.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-17. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.31.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-13. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.30.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-05. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.30.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-02-04. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.7
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-30. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.6
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-28. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.5
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-23. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.4
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-21. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.3
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-16. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.2
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2026-01-07. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.29.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-19. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.28.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-18. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.27.1
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-15. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.27.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-10. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.
v2.26.0
3 findingsThis version was published by a different npm account than previous versions on 2025-12-08. This could indicate a legitimate maintainer transition or an account compromise.
Modified file contains 1 long encoded string(s) (200+ chars). These are commonly used to hide malicious payloads.
Published via CI/CD with Sigstore attestation (predicate: https://slsa.dev/provenance/v1). This is the strongest supply chain integrity signal.