@cleartrip/ct-design-coupon
Supply chain provenance
Status for the latest visible version.
Without SLSA provenance there is no cryptographic link between this tarball and the public source — the axios compromise (March 2026) relied on exactly this gap.
Maintainers
Accepted risks
Findings the reviewer chose to accept rather than block on.
| Source | Rule | Reason | Accepted by | When |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| bogus-package | bogus-package | AI (bogus-package): Internal design-system monorepo component; missing metadata is a consistent pattern across all @cleartrip/ct-design-* packages, not a spam indicator. | ai | |
| npm-metadata | no-description | AI (npm-metadata): Stable pattern across all @cleartrip/ct-design-* packages; not indicative of malicious intent. | ai |
v3.22.0
2 findingsPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Consider requesting the maintainer enable provenance via CI/CD.
This version was published by a different npm account (sidhantrajan) than the most recent previously approved version (saranshdawra) on 2026-06-09, but sidhantrajan is listed as a maintainer on prior approved versions (matched on name). This looks like a manual publish by a known maintainer rather than a publisher change. Recorded as INFO for audit trail.
v3.20.0
1 findingPackage was published without Sigstore provenance. Only ~12% of npm packages have provenance, so this is common but not ideal.